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I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007-2012 was an almost unprecedented
American economic depression, the impacts of which will be felt for
years to come. In the search for the cause of such catastrophic events,
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Pace University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; A.B.,
University of Southern California.
147
148 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:147
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and, more specifically, credit de-
fault swaps (CDS) have been a key focal point of the crisis aftermath.
A critical element of the Dodd-Frank bill has focused on reducing the
inherent risk in these OTC derivative transactions in an attempt to
eradicate some of the interconnectedness in our financial system that
lead to the domino effect of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers col-
lapsing and the American Insurance Group (AIG) needing a massive
federal bailout to avoid a similar fate.' One of the central tools to that
end is the emergence of a clearing requirement for certain types of
OTC transactions. 2
The promulgation of this clearing requirement culminated in the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) issuance of a
Final Rule on the requirement in December 2012.3 Most entities that
transact in OTC derivatives were required to come into compliance
with the Final Rule by February 11, 2013; some were given an exten-
sion until March 11, 2013.4 As the rule is now in full effect, this paper
will analyze some of the rule's shortcomings and propose solutions to
impending problems.
Several papers have argued the merits of the clearinghouse model
as an adequate solution to such a catastrophic issue. This paper in-
tends to focus on the adequacy of the Final Rule promulgated by the
CFTC on December 13, 2012, rather than weigh the pros and cons of a
general clearinghouse model, which is the approach the CFTC has al-
ready clearly taken. Specifically, this paper will critique the potential
gaps in three of the six regulations the Final Rule enacted that could
undermine the effectiveness of the entire Rule. First though, it is im-
portant to understand how we got here and why OTC derivatives, and
CDSs more specifically, have been so hotly targeted for regulatory
change.
Part II of this paper discusses the broad impacts of the financial
crisis beginning in 2007 and ties the roots of this crisis to the de-regu-
lation of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Part II also explains what
derivatives and CDSs are and the inherent risks they pose. Part III
discusses the Dodd-Frank Act's proposed solutions, namely the afore-
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial
Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank's Attack on Systemic Economic
Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. 127, 147 (2011).
2. Dodd-Frank § 723(h)(1)(A).
3. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284
(Dec. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50).
4. Id.
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mentioned clearing requirement. Part III also describes the workings
of a clearinghouse in general and attempts to explain why the CFTC
chose this solution. Part IV provides an analysis of the Final Rule.
Finally, Part V critiques the potential holes in the Final Rule and of-
fers some potential solutions.
II. BACKGROUND
By almost any measure, the financial crisis of the late 2000s was one
of the deepest and most widespread depressions in U.S. economic his-
tory. As early as 2009, before the scope of the crisis was even fully
understood, some analysts were already pegging the crisis as the worst
since the Great Depression.5 Even today, the future of the American
economy remains murky with little certainty as to when a full recovery
will be complete.6 Many people have spent the past few years with an
eye towards the past in an attempt to find a root cause of the crisis in
order to eradicate from our system the type of financial virus that
could cause such harm and, perhaps, to find a scapegoat. Soon after
the economic swell began, credit derivatives became the primary
scapegoat.7
Before understanding why these financial products became the
poster child for an unchecked Wall Street, it is important to first un-
derstand what derivatives are and how they function. An understand-
ing of the basic nature and power of derivatives makes it possible to
see how this particular financial instrument was capable of creating
such a cataclysmic effect on the global economy.
A. Basic Overview of Derivatives
A derivative is a financial instrument that allows its owners to bet
"on the direction they believe financial markets will move, without
ever needing to own tangible assets."8 The purpose of using deriva-
tives is to limit one's risk, often referred to as exposure, to various
events, such as price fluctuations. 9 For example, a farmer who wants
5. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTj
r852TI.
6. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, A New Housing Boom? Don't Count On It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/business/housing-markets-future-still-has-many-
clouds.html.
7. See, e.g., Credit Derivatives Used as Scapegoat for Crunch-ING, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2008,
1:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/16/cds-ing-idUSLG41075320081016.
8. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13
N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 41 (2009).
9. Id.
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to protect himself against a fluctuation in corn prices may hedge him-
self via a bet on the future price of corn. Thus, a derivative is simply a
financial product whose "value is 'derived' from underlying assets like
mortgages, stocks, bonds, or commodities" like corn.10 By some esti-
mations, derivatives have existed for thousands of years." The use of
derivatives in American history has been traced back to the mid-
1800s, when farmers would hedge price fluctuations in various kinds
of crops to protect themselves from potentially exorbitant losses.12
An important distinction between a derivative product and other
financial products is that the purchaser of a corn future, for instance,
does not need to own any underlying tangible asset; the purchaser is
simply betting against future price changes or some other market
event. Specifically, credit derivatives are products that transfer the
risk of non-repayment on a credit obligation to the purchaser of the
derivative.' 3 The original party holding the credit risk, a retail bank
for instance, packages the risk into a "product" and sells it to a party,
perhaps a financial institution, which in return provides the bank with
a semi-regular fee.14 At the heart of this transaction is a shell game;
no risk is eliminated via the transfer, rather, it is just moved from one
party who values the risk less than the other party.15
The critical element to understand in this credit derivative transac-
tion is that the shifting enables the parties to "detach[ ] the risk im-
bedded in an asset from the expected returns from holding the asset,
[thus] enabling the market to freely trade credit risk completely sepa-
rate from assets."1 6 The purchaser has assumed the risk of non-pay-
ment.' 7 That is, the purchaser has acquired the exposure of a
commodity to the underlying market, which affects the value of the
underlying asset.'8 For example, when Bank A buys a securitized
bundle of mortgages from a lending institution, Bank A is directly sus-
ceptible to fluctuations in the housing market without owning a house
or a mortgage directly.19 While a useful and powerful tool to hedge
10. Id. at 40.
11. Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives
Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1155 (2012) (suggesting that the use of derivatives pre-
dates American civilization).
12. Greenberger, supra note 1, at 128.
13. Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory Initiatives: A
New World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 169, 171 (2009).
14. Id. at 172.
15. Id. at 171.
16. Id. at 172.
17. Moran, supra note 8, at 41.
18. Dutt, supra note 13, at 172.
19. For more on securitization of mortgages, see Griffith, supra note 11, at 1165-66.
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against risk, the lack of regulation in place to check these types of bets
was a significant contributor to the demise of multiple financial
institutions.
B. Over-the-Counter Derivatives
There are two primary markets for derivatives transactions: ex-
change trading and over-the-counter (OTC) trading. The OTC deriv-
atives market is made up of "'bilateral' contracts between dealers, and
contracting parties accordingly bear all of the risks inherent in their
transaction, including both market risk and counterparty risk."20 That
is, each party is subject to the risk that market forces will affect the
value of their trade (be it the housing market or any other underlying
forces) and that the other party in the contract, the counterparty, can-
not make the agreed, contractual payments. This latter risk is the crit-
ical element of derivatives transactions that the CFTFC's final rule on
mandatory clearing of certain types of derivatives focuses on, as will
be discussed at length in Part IV of this paper. 21
OTC transactions allow derivatives traders to greatly increase their
leverage.22 They do so by allowing traders to enter a transaction that
simulates the returns of a party owning a certain stock, for instance,
without requiring purchase of the stock and often requiring little to no
collateral. 23 By putting forth only a small percentage of the financial
allocation required to purchase stock, these traders can be exposed to
the same potential gains and losses as traditional stock market partici-
pants: a so-called "naked call." 24
While it is important to understand the steps taken to mitigate this
risk, it is also critical to understand what caused the risk to be so per-
vasive and impactful on the broader financial market. In December
2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA)
was signed into law by President Clinton.25 One of the principal ef-
fects of the CFMA was to "remove[ ] OTC derivatives transactions ...
from all requirements of exchange trading and clearing under the
20. Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 55, 89 (2011).
21. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,284 (Dec. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50).
22. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 49 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Greenberger, supra note 1, at 142 (quotation omitted); Commodity Futures Moderniza-
tion Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, § 1(a)(5) (enacting into law § 401 of Title IV of H.R. 5660 (114
Stat. 2763A-457), as introduced on Dec. 14 2000 (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2)).
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CEA [Commodity Exchange Act] so long as the counterparties to the
swap were eligible contract participants," which basically required
only that each party had more than $10 million in total assets or was
trading for risk management purposes.26 Additionally, there were
many provisions in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) that specifi-
cally did not then apply to the OTC derivatives market, including dis-
closure, clearing requirements, capital adequacy requirements, and
more, all of which were in place to guarantee some oversight and sta-
bility in these types of transactions.27 By any measure, the CFMA
represented broad deregulation of the OTC derivatives market. One
other significant aspect of this deregulation was to allow "excessive
speculation," setting the stage for the type of massive, over-leveraged
market that was doomed to fail.28 Estimates show that the OTC mar-
ket had a notional value of $596 trillion at the time of the crisis.29
C. Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps (CDS) are a type of OTC derivative used as
''quasi-insurance policies on debt instruments . . . to guard against
credit losses from default."30 CDSs are essentially contracts to trans-
fer the risk of bad credit events, which often amount to a default in
some variety or another depending on the underlying asset.31 More
broadly, these bad credit events, often referred to simply as credit
events, are any "negative development relating to the specified refer-
ence debt obligation, such as a failure to pay under the obligation or
the bankruptcy of the entity that issued the reference obligation." 32
Often, CDSs would be used as guarantees on collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) 33 or "contractual instruments intended to insure
against losses . . . when a particular bond or security goes into de-
fault."34 CDOs were basically new financial instruments created by
bankers and were the result of multiple steps of securitization.35 The
first step was the creation of mortgage-backed securities, which basi-
cally turn underlying mortgages, with their "predictable income
26. Greenberger, supra note 1, at 142.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 143-44.
30. Moran, supra note 8, at 41.
31. Dutt, supra note 13, at 172.
32. Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation and Its Limits: The Evolution of the Credit
Default Swaps Market, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 689, 690 (2009/2010).
33. Greenberger, supra note 1, at 145.
34. Moran, supra note 8, at 41.
35. Griffith, supra note 11, at 1166.
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stream," into tradable securities. 36 Importantly, this allowed the
proliferation of the housing market risk to spread throughout broad
swaths of the financial system.37 As sundry publications have de-
tailed, these security packages, comprised of high, medium, and low
credit ratings, would then be repeatedly re-bundled in an effort to in-
crease the credit rating.38 This second, and sometimes third or fourth,
repackaging would create what is known as a CDO. Notably, almost
always, the debtor, who holds the underlying asset, is not made privy
to the transaction, which speaks to the great and unknown risks that
these transactions were subjected to 3 9 because the "primary purpose
of CDSs is to make it easier for banks to sell complex debt securities
to investors[.]" 40
Credit default swaps were, at first, a simple insurance mechanism to
protect CDO owners against loss. However, once defaults began en
masse in the housing market, CDOs began to fail, and the issuers of
credit default swaps were faced with tremendous payment obliga-
tions.41 In layman's terms, this is akin to an insurance company forced
to pay out claims after a tremendous natural disaster but only if the
natural disaster spread throughout the entire United States. Coupled
with the gap in regulation mentioned earlier, it is easy to see how the
proliferation of these derivatives contracts was able to sink the U.S.
economy.
III. OTC DERIVATIVES AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. The Role of OTC Derivatives in the Financial Crisis
Common understanding now points to the OTC derivatives market
as one of the central causes of the economic collapse of the late
2000s. 4 2 When the U.S. housing market, long "inflated by a combina-
tion of government policy, unscrupulous lending practices, and finan-
cial engineering," finally crashed in 2007, the financial collapse
began.43 As discussed in the last section of this paper, the impetus for
the power of derivatives to nearly bring down an entire economy is a
36. Id. at 1165.
37. Id. at 1166.
38. Id.; see also MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
39. Dutt, supra note 13, at 175.
40. Moran, supra note 8, at 41.
41. Greenberger, supra note 1, at 146.
42. Id. at 147; see also Ben Protess, Banks Face New Checks on Derivatives Trading, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013, 11:07 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/
banks-face-new-checks-on-derivatives-trading/?_r=0 (suggesting the derivatives market blew up
and largely caused the 2008 crisis).
43. Griffith, supra note 11, at 1164 (internal citations omitted).
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result of their innate connection to the housing market. The securi-
tization of mortgages-often sub-prime mortgages, which come with a
higher risk of default-and the successive repackaging of these mort-
gages to generate higher credit ratings meant that the insurance on
these contracts was increasingly important.44 This insurance, of
course, came in the form of credit default swaps. However, because
these types of OTC derivatives were "pegged to the economic per-
formance of an overheated .. . housing market, the sudden collapse of
that market triggered under-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees,"
and the demise of the housing market spelled doom for the massive
derivatives market.45
Even those who do not find OTC derivatives to be the central cause
of the collapse understand that their use intensified the crisis.46
Zachary Gubler discusses two principal ways in which OTC deriva-
tives "exacerbated" the crisis: first, by allowing derivatives dealers to
assume tremendous exposure to CDOs and, second, by contributing
to "bank-like runs."47 One example of the first intensification factor
that Gubler points to is American International Group Financial
Products (AIGFP), an arm of the American Insurance Group (AIG)
that dealt largely in credit derivative transactions.48 The much-publi-
cized bailout of AIG is all the indication one needs to understand that
the lack of regulation, and what Gubler calls "faulty risk modeling,"49
underlying these transactions was a disastrous cocktail of under-ap-
preciation for the power of derivatives.
Gubler also discusses the impact of these transactions on banks,
namely Bear Stearns, in a "bank-like run" scenario, which can be
equated to a sort of spiraling downfall.50 First, investors were shielded
from understanding the bank's exposure to these transactions based
on Bear Stearns' lack of transparency and "institutional complex-
ity."51 Next, once news of the bank's financial troubles became
known, their counterparties attempted to reduce their exposure to the
bank.52 It is important to keep in mind here that because these trans-
actions were OTC, not exchange-based, they were severely under-reg-
ulated, and Bear Stearns' counterparties directly bore the risk of Bear
44. Id. at 1165.
45. Greenberger, supra note 1, at 128.
46. Gubler, supra note 20, at 87.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 88.
51. Gubler, supra note 20, at 88.
52. Id.
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Stearns' demise. The pullback of Bear Stearns' counterparties had the
effect of decreasing Bear Stearns' liquidity, thus "accelerating its
failure."53
As the Bear Stearns example and federal bailouts more broadly in-
dicate, there can be no question that the implosion of these largely
unregulated transactions caused an unforeseeable and possibly un-
precedented impact in the U.S. financial market. In response, the Fi-
nancial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was appointed to inquire
into the causes of the late 2000s crash.54 The FCIC issued a report
entitled, "The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the Na-
tional Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Cri-
sis in the United States."55 The report, in part, analyzed the
proliferation of derivatives and pointed to their widespread use as a
result of the removal of "virtually all regulation or oversight" in the
CFMA. 56 Because of the unregulated and tremendous exposure-col-
lateral gap spurred by the housing boom of the late 1990s and early
2000s, banks and insurance firms began to deal in large quantities of
these products with minimal, if any, financial safeguards in place.57
AIG is an example of a firm that was allowed to "accumulate a [$500
billion] position in credit risk through the OTC market without being
required to post one dollar's worth of initial collateral or making any
other provision for loss."58
Further exacerbating this ticking time bomb was the concentration
of the massive market for these types of transactions within an ex-
tremely small sector of firms. In fact, the FCIC report found that 97
percent of the notional amount of OTC derivatives were traded by
only five institutions: JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America,
Wachovia, and HSBC. 59 To put this in perspective, the same report
found that the value of underlying assets for credit default swaps
transactions reached $58.2 trillion in 2007, almost a ten-fold increase
since 2004.60
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Editorial, Facts and the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at WK7,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20sun1.html.
55. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22.
56. Id. at 48.
57. Id. at 50.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 50.
2014] 155
156 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 12:147
Some have argued that the financial crisis was largely a result of
investor panic.61 It is quite possible that this panic was intensified be-
cause, as the FCIC report suggests, all eyes were on the derivatives
market while the risks and worst-case scenarios were a complete
mystery. 62
Some of the numerical results of the various post mortems of the
financial crisis are stunning, even with a few years perspective. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury released a report about their re-
sponse to the crisis in April 2012 with some stunning statistics. 6 3 From
2007 to 2009, 8.8 million jobs were lost.6 4 Additionally, households
lost a total of $19.2 trillion in wealth, and real GDP fell more than five
percent from its pre-recession peak.65 These are astounding numbers,
and there is little doubt that the unregulated OTC derivatives market
is largely to blame. 66
B. Congressional Response: Dodd-Frank and Clearinghouses
To no one's surprise, lawmakers attempted to respond swiftly and
powerfully to the financial crisis with sweeping legislation intended to
put some teeth back into the regulation of financial products and en-
sure that our nation's economy could not be undone by a handful of
institutions making risky, under-collateralized bets. The primary
mechanism for this change was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, created "to overhaul the United States
financial regulatory structure in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 finan-
cial meltdown." 67
1. Clearinghouses
One of the focal points of Dodd-Frank has been the use of clearing-
houses in OTC derivatives transactions. Before delving into the sub-
stantive law, it is first important to understand what a clearinghouse
61. See, e.g., Tom Groenfeldt, Senseless Panic-How the Financial Crisis Could Have Been
Contained, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2012/
08/24/senseless-panic-how-the-financial-crisis-could-have-been-contained/.
62. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 51 (suggesting that the financial crisis was
an unknown battlefield).
63. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSE IN CHARTS (2012), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Documents/20120413_FinancialCri
sisResponse.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Time to Unravel the Knot of Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/business/25gret.html.
67. Robert M. Jaworski, There's a New Kid on the Block: What You Need to Know About the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 266 N.J. LAw. 14, 14 (2010).
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does and does not do. Clearinghouses have been in existence as a
mechanism to control the derivatives market since the late 19th cen-
tury.68 A clearinghouse acts as "the buyer to every seller, and the
seller to every buyer" in a given contractual transaction.69 So, for ex-
ample, when Bank A agrees to a credit default swap transaction with
Insurance Company B in a world without clearinghouses, the Bank
and the Insurance Company are each other's counterparty. The func-
tion of a clearinghouse is that it becomes the counterparty to each
contract, thus, bearing the risk of one party defaulting and subse-
quently decreasing that risk to the non-defaulting party.70 This can be
an invaluable mechanism to prevent excessive counterparty risk, the
downside of which is easily seen from the aforementioned Bear
Stearns example.
Clearinghouses are also aptly termed centralized counterparties. 71
By acting as a sort of go-between for contracting parties and handling
the contractual payments for their members, clearinghouses help man-
age counterparty risk.72 Thus, members to the clearinghouse "no
longer face the risk that counterparties will default" and are addition-
ally benefitted by the clearinghouse acting "as a guarantor for transac-
tions executed on the clearinghouse platform."73 However, that is not
to say that they are without risk themselves. Just like in the non-
clearinghouse model in which each party's potential to default im-
poses risk on their counterparty, a clearinghouse may also default or
become overburdened. This danger requires clearinghouses to em-
ploy their own risk-management tactics and ensure their capability to
make good on their payment obligations to all transactions.74
Therefore, while clearinghouses mitigate one type of risk, they also
create another. On the one hand, clearinghouses insulate a given
member from "the risk that another member will default on obliga-
tions cleared and settled on the clearinghouse platform."75 On the
other hand, however, clearinghouses "concentrate default risk,"
meaning that the bankruptcy of a single clearinghouse could have the
68. Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, REGULATION., Winter 2008-2009, at 45, available
at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2008/11/v31n4-1.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 45-46.
71. Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: Why Central-
ized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 49, 51
(2011).
72. Id.
73. Kristin N. Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 681, 694 (2012).
74. Id.
75. Id.
2014] 157
158 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:147
devastating impact of the default of many counterparties. 76 There-
fore, systemic risk remains pervasive, even in a clearinghouse model.
As such, many papers have focused on the management and oversight
policies a clearinghouse should adopt."7 This paper does not explore
that particular aspect of clearinghouses, but Part V does address some
of the shortcomings of the clearinghouse-focused model promulgated
in the CFTC's final rule on mandatory clearing.
2. Dodd-Frank
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
was one of the most massive regulatory overhauls of the last decade.
The bill was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.
The buildup to this ultimate approval was rife with staunch opposition
from Wall Street, where firms dedicated three years and hundreds of
millions of dollars to fighting the bill.78 Whether one argues that the
bill went too far or not far enough, it is massive in scope and attempts
to impose greater regulations on a wide swath of financial activity.
The basic structure of the bill is divided into sixteen provisions, Title
I through Title XVI. Each section works more or less as a framework
for further rulemaking, often delegated to specific federal agencies.
The critical section for the purposes of this paper is Title VII, also
known as the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act.79
This section primarily deals with regulating OTC transactions.80 Title
VII is designed to create a new framework for oversight into the
swaps market and delegates powers to the CFTC and SEC to that
end.81 So while Congress created the framework for the overall legis-
lative reform, it is the CFTC and SEC that are charged with actually
creating the specific rules and regulations regarding OTC derivatives.
As has been discussed several times, this power was wielded in the
CFTC's final rule on mandatory clearing for certain types of
transactions. 82
76. Id. at 695.
77. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 11, at 1153.
78. Ben Protess, Wall Street is Bracing for the Dodd-Frank Rules to Kick In, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/wall-street-
is-bracing-for-the-dodd-frank-rules-to-kick-in/? r=0.
79. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 701, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641 (2010).
80. See id. at 1641-1802.
81. Charles L. Hauch, Dodd-Frank's Swap Clearing Requirements and Systemic Risk, 30 YALE
J. ON REG. 277, 282 (2013).
82. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 240,
74,284, (Dec. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50).
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As stated in the final rule, which will be discussed in further detail
in Part IV, "[c]learing is at the heart of the Dodd-Frank financial re-
form."8 3 Responding to the tremendous risks when market partici-
pants could not accurately estimate their counterparty's exposure to
market movements and other events, central clearing emerged as a
globally accepted quasi-solution." In the absence of central clearing,
market participants bear their own risk of default by their
counterparty.85 Therefore, Title VII, and its creation of a new regula-
tory framework for swaps, hinged largely on the requirement that
swaps are cleared by a derivatives clearing organization (DCO). 86 As
the final rule states:
The CEA [Commodity Exchange Act], as amended by Title VII,
now requires a swap: (1) To be cleared through a DCO if the Com-
mission has determined that the swap, or group, category, type, or
class of swap, is required to be cleared, unless an exception to the
clearing requirement applies; (2) to be reported to a swap data re-
pository (SDR) or the Commission; and (3) if the swap is subject to
a clearing requirement, to be executed on a designated contract
market (DCM) or swap execution facility (SEF), unless no DCM or
SEF has made the swap available to trade.87
As justification for this change, the Commission thought that a clear-
ing requirement would reduce counterparty credit risk as well as offer
an "organized mechanism for collateralizing the risk exposures posed
by swaps."88 In layman's terms, the idea is that proper collateraliza-
tion, plus reduced counterparty risk, equals no more AIGs. While the
above excerpt offers a simple, high-level overview of Title VII, we
now turn to the Final Rule for more detail.
IV. THE FINAL RULE
On December 13, 2012, the CFTC published 77 FR 74284, a final
rule in the Federal Register entitled, "Clearing Requirement Determi-
nation Under Section 2(h) of the [Commodity Exchange Act]; Final
Rule." 89 The rule became effective on February 11, 2013.90 The rule
is organized into six sections: background, comments on the notice of
proposed rulemaking, the final rule itself, implementation, cost bene-
83. Id. at 74,285.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,285.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 74,284.
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fit considerations, and "related matters." 91 This paper will provide a
brief overview of the rule's overall framework and analyze more
deeply some of the most critical sections.
A. Abstract and Background
The rule begins with a summary detailing its establishment of a
clearing requirement for certain classes of credit default swaps and
interest rate swaps under new section 2(h)(1)(A) of the Commodity
Exchange Act. 92 Additionally, regulations to prevent evasion of the
clearing requirement are discussed.
Following this abstract, the final rule discusses the original clearing
requirement proposal. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
was issued on August 7, 2012, and a window was open for thirty days
for comments on the proposed rulemaking. The rule then provides a
high-level summary of the financial crisis, the role of unregulated
OTC derivatives in the crisis, as well as some of its root causes.93 Re-
lying on the aforementioned report from the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, significant blame is attributed to OTC derivatives and to
credit default swaps in particular.94 This section of the rule then con-
tinues to discuss the central role of clearing in Dodd-Frank and the
global acceptance of centralized clearing as an appropriate regulatory
reaction to the worldwide financial crisis.95
B. Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Next, the rule reviews the thirty-day public comment period after
the NPRM was published.96 A total of thirty-three comments were
received, and the Commission met with "clearinghouses, market par-
ticipants, trade associations, public interest groups, and other inter-
ested parties." 97 Much of this section is simply a response by the
CFTC to the numerous comments and can be seen as a simple assur-
ance that the comments were duly noted.
91. Id.
92. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,284.
93. Id.
94. Id.; FIN. CIusis INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 22, at 56.
95. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,285.
96. Id. at 74,287.
97. Id.
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The comment section also discusses the five factors in a "determina-
tion analysis" for a given swap-that is, what the CFTC considers in
making a clearing determination. 98 These factors are:
(1) The existence of significant outstanding notional exposures,
trading liquidity, and adequate pricing data; (2) the availability of
rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and
credit support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms that are
consistent with the material terms and trading conventions on which
the contract is then traded; (3) the effect on the mitigation of sys-
temic risk, taking into account the size of the market for such con-
tract and the resources of the DCO available to clear the contract;
(4) the effect on competition, including appropriate fees and
charges applied to clearing; and (5) the existence of reasonable legal
certainty in the event of the insolvency of the relevant DCO or one
or more of its clearing members with regard to the treatment of
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property.99
These are known as the five statutory factors and have become an
important piece of the regulation.1oo The rule then discusses each fac-
tor in turn and proceeds to analyze specifically the types of transac-
tions (interest rate swaps and CDSs) that are subject to the clearing
mandate.10
C. Final Rules
The aptly titled Final Rules section of the Final Rule is, quite obvi-
ously, the heart of the publication. Under section 2(h)(2), the Com-
mission's six regulations were officially adopted.102 This paper will
review each of these in turn, as they are the crux of the CFTC's action.
Then, this paper will discuss the other sections of the final rule. Fi-
nally, Part V will address some shortcomings and potential pitfalls of
the regulations.
First, Regulation 50.1 was adopted, defining a few key terms. 03
The first term defined is "business day," which excludes Saturday and
Sunday.104 The second term is "day of execution." 05 Because of the
global nature of the swaps community, there were often seemingly
simplistic difficulties in determining which day a swap transaction oc-
98. Id. at 74,292.
99. Id.
100. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,292.
101. Id. at 74,294.
102. Id. at 74,314.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,314.
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curred, which is critical because of the same-day requirement for sub-
mitted swaps to a DCO.106 For instance, it would be unclear whether
a transaction completed Monday at 1 PM in New York with a broker
in London would fall on Monday or Tuesday. That is because the
London business day would "close" after 4 PM, and ordinarily the
swap would be registered as occurring on Tuesday. This clearly is an
improper result. Therefore, the new definition of "day of execution"
is defined as the "calendar day of the party to the swap that ends
latest, giving the parties the maximum amount of time to submit their
swaps to a DCO while still requiring such submission on a same-day
basis."107 In response to a comment, the Commission clarified that
there is no prohibition on late-day submission of swaps.108
Next, the Commission adopted Regulation 50.2, entitled, "Treat-
ment of Swaps Subject to a Clearing Requirement."1 09 The crux of
this rule is that all persons, other than those who use the section 50.50
exception, must submit their swaps for clearing by a DCO "as soon as
technologically practicable and no later than the end of the day of
execution."o10 Quite clearly, this is to ensure that swaps are submitted
to DCOs in a timely fashion, minimizing risk and ensuring compliance
with the overall goals of the clearing requirement."' A few interest-
ing points of clarification were raised in comments to which the CFTC
responded. First, the Commission clarified that non-clearing members
satisfy their duties by submitting the swap to their Futures Commis-
sion Merchant (FCM) clearing member.112 Also, the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) raised a question as to the
status of foreign entities." 3 The Commission expressly exempted
"foreign governments, foreign central banks, and international finan-
cial institutions" from section 2(h)(1) of the CEA.114 Because of the
continued reliance by the Commission on issues already addressed by
the end-user exception rulemaking, there is a significant amount of
overlap between that rule and the rule in question. As such, Part V of
this paper will discuss both and the shortcomings they present.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,329.
111. Id. at 74,314.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 74,315.
114. Id.
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The next regulation is section 50.3: "Notice to the Public."" 5 This
regulation is relatively straightforward and simply requires the partici-
pating DCOs to post a list of swaps they will accept for clearing and to
indicate which swaps require mandatory clearing on their website.116
Section 50.4: "Classes of Swaps Required To Be Cleared" is a more
controversial regulation." 7 By limiting the classes of swaps covered
by the mandatory clearing requirement to a relatively conventional
group of four interest-rate swaps and two credit default swaps, the
Commission attempted to lighten the burden on counterparties in
quickly determining whether a particular swap requires clearing or
not."i8 While ensuring the speed and ease of these transactions is an
admirable goal, the focus on easing this burden as a critical factor for
which swaps should be cleared creates other issues. The Commission
also makes clear, in a response to a comment by TriOptima, that it will
not require parties to disentangle swaps that require partial clearing,
as it is not trying to foster structuring swaps in a particular manner so
long as the swap serves a legitimate business purpose.119 One other
important piece of this regulation that the Commission outlines is that
in the event of ownership changes-where a swap is not subject to a
clearing requirement at the time of execution-it may become subject
to clearing because it has transferred owners either via novation, ex-
change, transfer, or conveyance.120 This is a critical point of clarifica-
tion by the Commission and will also be discussed in Part V.
The next regulation, section 50.5: "Clearing Transition Rules," sim-
ply exempts some swaps entered into prior to the enactment of Dodd-
Frank from clearing, despite being of a class regulated under section
50.4.121 The penultimate regulation is section 50.6: "Delegation of Au-
thority[.]"122 This regulation simply clarifies that the power to deter-
mine whether a swap falls within a section 50.4 class rests with the
Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk or his/her designee.123
Finally, there is Regulation 50.10: "Prevention of Evasion of the
Clearing Requirement and Abuse of an Exception or Exemption to
115. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,315.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 74,316.
119. Id.
120. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,316.
121. Id. at 74,316-17.
122. Id. at 74,317.
123. Id.
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the Clearing Requirement." 124 This is an extraordinarily important
regulation because it gets to the very heart of the fundamental ques-
tion here: can financial institutions and others simply change the basic
nature of their swaps so they do not have to be cleared? This is a
deeply troubling prospect for the CFTC, as well as the Legislative and
Executive branches that stand behind Dodd-Frank, as Title VII is one
of the most critical aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 50.10 pro-
hibits "evasions of the requirements of section 2(h) of the CEA and
abuse of any exemption or exception to the requirements of section
2(h)."125 More specifically, this regulation makes it "unlawful for any
person to knowingly or recklessly evade, participate in, or facilitate an
evasion of any of the requirements of section 2(h)." 126
While the rule itself is certainly important, what is more interesting
in this regulation is the approach that the Commission articulates it
will take in dealing with potential violations. First, they adopt a "prin-
ciples-based approach" and outright decline to put a bright-line rule
regarding evasive or abusive conduct in place, therefore requiring a
case-by-case approach. 127 Next, the Commission addressed a query
from the ISDA regarding legitimate business purposes.128 ISDA sug-
gested that a business' decision to enter into a swap that does not
require clearance "because [the uncleared swap] is cheaper, or free of
unwanted aspects of clearing or trading" should be deemed legiti-
mate.129 The Commission's response was to state that an entity "may
have legitimate business purposes for entering" these kinds of transac-
tions and that it "is not, in and of itself, dispositive that the [entity] is
acting without a legitimate business purpose in a particular case." 30
In limiting this potentially dangerous language, the Commission stated
that it would be dispositive if it was shown that the only purpose for
entering a given swap transaction not requiring clearance was to avoid
the clearing requirement but committed itself only to case-by-case fu-
ture analysis and not a clear standard.' 3 ' Despite recognizing the un-
certainty this stance places upon swap dealers, the Commission
neglected to go further.132
124. Id.
125. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,317.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 74,318.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 74,319 (internal citation omitted).
130. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,319.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
The central argument of this paper is that the massive OTC deriva-
tives market remains susceptible to several risks despite the formida-
ble effort of Dodd-Frank and the CIFTC's Final Rule on Mandatory
Clearing. To that end. this paper will discuss three critical areas of
foreseen administrative, cost, and consistency concerns with regard to
various aspects of the clearing process. Each of these concerns relates
to a specific regulation in the Final Rule, and the three regulations in
question are section 50.2 - "Treatment of Swaps Subject to a Clearing
Requirement," section 50.4 - "Classes of Swaps Required To Be
Cleared," and section 50.10 - "Prevention of Evasion of the Clearing
Requirement and Abuse of an Exception or Exemption to the Clear-
ing Requirement." As each of these regulations are discussed in turn,
it is important to keep in mind the lessons learned in Part III of this
paper about why the clearinghouse model is preferred in the first
place.
Before discussing section 50.2, it is important to note one key ex-
ception that the CFTC promulgated prior to this Final Rule: the End-
User Exception, which has received significant coverage in previous
papers.133 This exception was created, in part, to help mitigate the
cost of a clearing requirement on certain end-users. 134 This exception
permits avoidance of the clearing requirement when one party to the
swap is not a financial entity, is using swaps to hedge/mitigate com-
mercial risk, and notifies the CFTC generally how it meets its financial
obligations relating to non-cleared swaps.135 There was an almost im-
mediate reaction in the press regarding this exception and its implica-
tions for the overall efficacy of Title VII.136 While this paper is not
meant to discuss the merits of the end-user exception, it is important
background information to keep in mind as section 50.2 is discussed.
Solely evaluating section 50.2 on its own merits would not adequately
portray the potential risks it presents.
133. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Liabo, The New Threat to Financial Reform: The End-User Exception
to Dodd-Frank Mandatory Swap Clearance, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 117, 118 (2011) (discussing
the merits of varying scope possibilities for the end-user exemption and then putting forth a
proposal on how to properly define an end-user).
134. Id. at 127 (discussing the merits of varying scope possibilities for the end-user exemption
and then putting forth a proposal on how to properly define an end-user).
135. See End-User Exception to the Clearing Requirements for Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,560
(July 19, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39).
136. Ben Protess, In New Rules to Shine Light on Derivatives, Regulators Also Allow Exemp-
tions, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK BLOG (July 10, 2012, 2:94 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
07/10/in-new-rules-to-shine-light-on-derivatives-regulators-also-allow-exemptions/.
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A. Section 50.2: Treatment of Swaps Subject to a
Clearing Requirement
As discussed in Part IV, section 50.2 provides a general overview of
the proper procedure for swaps subject to the clearing requirement.
The critical flaw in this regulation is mimicked from the end-user ex-
ception. The regulation provides that "foreign governments, foreign
central banks, and international financial institutions should not be
subject to Section 2(h)(1) of the CEA." 37 While there are doubtless
other concerns in play with regard to regulating international institu-
tions and the legality of doing so, there can be no question that this
represents a complete exemption for a potentially significant portion
of the OTC derivatives market.
On its face, this is the least troublesome of the three regulations.
However, when combined with the other two issues below, as well as
the end-user exception, one begins to see how a potentially universal
regulation becomes less and less comprehensive. Of course, the less
comprehensive the regulation, the more susceptible our financial mar-
kets remain to the very same risks Title VII was enacted to prevent.
B. Section 50.4: Classes of Swaps Required to Be Cleared
There are two aspects of section 50.4 that warrant consideration
here: one of them creating further risk and one of them helping to
mitigate potential risks. The former is the lack of a disentangling re-
quirement, while the latter is the status of a clearing requirement in
the event of an ownership change on the transaction.
First, the Commission explains its decision to use "basic specifica-
tions to identify the swaps subject to the clearing requirement" as an
attempt to allow "counterparties contemplating entering into a swap
[to] determine quickly as a threshold matter whether or not the partic-
ular swap may be subject to a clearing requirement."1 38 There is no
question this rationalization is centered on cost-prohibitiveness. Were
the rule to be complex and require a significant burden on counterpar-
ties upon entering every single swap transaction, the transaction costs
would be astounding, particularly when considering the tremendous
volume of these agreements that institutions typically enter. How-
ever, not all swaps fit neatly into one simple bucket. As the Final
Rule recognizes, there are ample situations where a swap, under the
current regulations, would have one clearable part and one, or several,
137. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,315.
138. Id. at 74,316.
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non-clearable parts.139 Rather than require these swaps to either be
disentangled or cleared so long as any portion of them requires clear-
ance, the Commission chose the opposite, simply exempting the swaps
from clearance if they require disentanglement.140 All this perverse
decision does is incentivize the creation of non-basis, entangled swaps
transactions as a surefire way around the clearing requirement, con-
tingent only upon the additional costs of creating the more compli-
cated transaction.
Next, the Commission addressed the implications of an ownership
change, whether by "assignment, novation, exchange, transfer or con-
veyance."141 Simply put, the Commission decided that an outright,
permanent clearing exemption for swaps that did not require clearing
based on the initial counterparties to the transaction would be inade-
quate.142 The Commission points out that this would create tremen-
dous incentives to "trade historical swaps."143 Furthermore, this could
simply create conduit entities that are exempt from clearing require-
ments but exist simply to enter into transactions and then assign their
rights to a party that would have been subject to the clearing require-
ment. While the initial transaction and set-up costs may be daunting,
there are tremendous opportunities for economies of scale for an en-
tity like this. In this regard, section 50.4 got things right, with one
minor exception. The language of the regulation, however, leaves
somewhat undecided exactly when a transaction would be subject to a
post-initiation clearing requirement. The regulation offers an exam-
ple regarding a financial entity entering into a transaction with an ex-
empt end-user and the end-user later transferring his ownership rights
to a second financial institution; however, this is a plainly obvious case
in which the clearing would be required.144 Missing here is some gui-
dance concerning commercial entities because they are the organiza-
tions that are in the end-user exception gray area.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,316.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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C. Section 50.10: Prevention of Evasion of the Clearing
Requirement and Abuse of an Exception or Exemption
to the Clearing Requirement
Finally, section 50.10(a) intends to "make it unlawful for any person
to knowingly or recklessly evade, participate in, or facilitate an eva-
sion of any of the requirements of section 2(h)."145 Unfortunately, it
is not always patently obvious when an entity is avoiding the clearing
requirement because of a legitimate business purpose. To that end,
the Commission "accepts that a person may have legitimate business
purposes for entering into swaps that are not subject to the clearing
requirement."146 However, they also outright refused to "provide a
bright-line test of non-evasive or abusive conduct."1 47 The Commis-
sion also committed itself to a "principles-based" approach and will
review questionable conduct on a strictly "case-by-case basis in light
of all the relevant facts and circumstances."1 48
While there is certainly a tremendous burden of devising a bright-
line rule when there are countless types of swaps and situations occur-
ring on a daily basis in this market, it seems as though the administra-
tive burden of not attempting to create a bright-line rule is significant.
It is an understood principle that bright-line rules are effective be-
cause they are predictive. While there is always the unknown, both in
how an agency will rule in a given case and in how they will evaluate a
given issue on a repeated basis, a bright-line rule at least invites some
sort of consistency. A case-by-case, principles-based analysis is partic-
ularly dangerous in the OTC derivatives market because it is so easy
to structure transactions that are unique and, therefore, can be distin-
guished from precedential evasive transactions. The regulation in sec-
tion 50.10(a) would seem to be actually inviting evasive conduct to a
certain degree, at least until some semblance of an enforcement strat-
egy for evasive conduct is delineated. This is particularly true for
short-term swaps transactions that would almost certainly be com-
pleted prior to the evasive conduct being proven. Unwinding these
transactions would likely be cost-prohibitive, and the only real remedy
would be a fine of some sort. Unfortunately, there is no guidance for
determining whether conduct is evasive or not, except a given entity's
belief that it has a legitimate business purpose for avoiding the clear-
ing requirement. As this will almost always come down to cost consid-
145. Id. at 74,317.
146. Id. at 74,319.
147. Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section (2)h of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,319.
148. Id.
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erations, the resulting questions will focus on the cost threshold that
will create a sufficiently legitimate business purpose, instead of focus-
ing on the conduct itself as a bright-line rule. Neglecting to promul-
gate some sort of bright-line test for evasive conduct, which notably
could always be tweaked in the future, is a fundamental flaw in the
Final Rule.
Individually, each of these exceptions or potential loopholes may
not be enough to negate the efficacy of the Final Rule. However,
working in concert, these exceptions and loopholes leave open the
high probability of continued risks that were prevalent in the OTC
derivatives market prior to the enactment of the Dodd Frank Act.
While there is no question that the mandatory clearing requirement is
a step in the right direction, its gaps in coverage are considerable.
Thus, the door is still ajar to unchecked OTC derivatives trading crip-
pling the U.S. economy.

